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I. BREADTH OF THE PROBLEM
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has a
dilemma. Imagine the Utopian States' positions a $236
million satellite system in the geosynchronous orbit to
broadcast Utopian programming into Atlantis. Atlantis is
outraged. Atlantis believes that Utopian programming not
only destroys the cultural identity of Atlantis, but also
advocates the overthrow of the Atlantian government.
Despite protests by Atlantis, the Utopian States assert that
international freedom of speech protects the broadcast. As
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a result, the Utopian broadcasting continues. Under
international law, who should win?'
Compelling policies support both sides of the issue. The Utopian
States, and absolute freedom of speech proponents, e.g., Western Europe,
Israel, contend that all nations benefit from the free exchange of ideas. This
position advocates the elimination of program content control, opposes prior
consent as a prerequisite for international broadcasts, and stresses an
internationally recognized right to receive and impart information by any
media and regardless of frontiers.2 Atlantis, and those opposing international
free speech, such as China and Saudi Arabia, argue that transboundary
satellite broadcasting destroys the preservation of national cultures. This
position advocates the prior consent of the state which may be affected by
the broadcast and emphasizes noninterference and principles of sovereignty.'
The United Nations first started discussing direct satellite
broadcasting (DBS)4 in the early 1960s, and has had an enormous amount of
trouble achieving any sort of consensus over general principles.5 To
persuade the ICJ, counsel for both sides have their work cut out for them
because both views are highly problematic. Consider first, however, the
background surrounding the DBS controversy, before we attempt to canvas
its inherent flaws.
I. This fact pattern resembles the ongoing tension between the United States and Cuba
created by Radio and TV Marti. Television Broadcasting to Cuba Act, Pub. L. No. 101-246, 104
Stat. 15 (1990). See J.H. Castro Villalobos, The DBS Declaration of 1982: The TV Marti Case, in
PROC. 37TH COLLOQUY L. OUTER SPACE 6 (1994).
2. Vincent B. Feher, "Television Without Frontiers": Possible United States Responses, 9
U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 65, 104-18 (1992).
3. GENNADY ZHUKOV & YURI KOLOsov, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 128 (1984).
4. There are three types of broadcasting technically possible through satellites. The first is
"point-to-point," involving an earth station which transmits a message to a satellite, which then
rebroadcasts it to a single ground station. The second is "distribution-type broadcasting," involving
community receivers. The third is "direct broadcast," in which the television signal is received
directly into the television from the satellite. See CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 606 (1982).
5. Stephen Doyle, Regulating the Geostationary Orbit: ITU's WARC-ORB '85-88, 15 J.
SPACE L. 1, 19 (1987). "There are deep philosophical differences over the role of the press and
government in society. Whoever is right or wrong, few Third World leaders are prepared to accept
the way Western correspondents feel they are obligated to report the news." MORT ROSENBLUM,
COUPS AND EARTHQUAKES, REPORTING FOR THE WORLD FOR AMERICA 24 (1979).
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE DBS DEBATE
Although DBS is the newest form of international communication, it
is certainly not the first.6  The ideological conflict between both sides
regarding the New World Information Order is arguably an extension of the
terrestrial version of the debate.' When telegraph lines first crossed
international borders, they were considered more of an affront to state
sovereignty than a development benefiting humanity in general. However,
national fears eventually subsided, and the telegraph is now an accepted
instrument for the promotion of peace.8
It is undisputed that DBS transmissions resemble earth-based radio
signals in that each disregard national frontiers.9 However, a DBS over the
Pacific Ocean could beam a program from the west coast of the United
States to a home television set in Indonesia."° For the first time in human
history, the New World Information Order makes it possible for a single
broadcasting station to send a message around the globe without going
through transmission stations or government sensors." Through a network
of only three strategically located communications satellites, any point on the
earth's surface may be reached by DBS. 2  Yet, despite the unprecedented
6. Commission on the Peace uses of Outer Space, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., at 13-16, U.N.
Doc. AMAC. 105/127 (1974). Indeed, it has been argued that the debate over international
communication began with the invention of the printing press in Asia in the 15th Century A.D. See
COLIN CLAIR, A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN PRINTING 158 (1976).
7. Francis J. Skrobiszewski, An Overview of the Problems, Perspectives and
Developments in International Communications and Information Flow, in 1 ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION: A WORKSHOP ON THE NEW WORLD INFORMATION ORDER
AND OTHER KEY ISSUES 1(1981).
The term, "New World Information Order," refers to a debate underway in a number
of international forums which encompasses a wide range of issues . . . .The core
issues in the current debate over the merits of a New World Information Order are...
related to similar considerations raised during previous periods of adjustment to
revolutionary changes in technology and governmental attempts at controlling the flow
of information to serve the sovereign's objectives. What distinguishes the New World
Information Order concept from earlier discussions of international organizations in
which Third World nations predominate; the development of computer systems,
satellite communications and other high-speed processing and transmission
technologies; and the recognition of information as a scarce resource.
Id.
8. James J. Moylan, The Role of International Telecommunications Union for the Promotion
of Peace Through Communications Satellites, 4 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 61 (1971).
9. Michael F. Flint, Signal Reception and Piracy, 11 INT'L BUS. L. 3 (1983).
10. Joel R. DePaul, images From Abroad: Making Direct Broadcasting by Satellites Safe for
Sovereignty, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 329, 330 (1986).
11. BENNO SIGNITZER, REGULATION OF DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM SATELLITE: U.N.
INVOLVEMENT 8 (1976).
12. NANDASIR JASENTULIYANA & ROY S. LEE, MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 284 (1979).
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ability of DBS transmissions to reach a greater number of people than ever
before, 3 the international community has reached little agreement on the
issue of transboundary DBS transmissions in this era of information."
Proponents on either side of the dispute would at least acknowledge
that the debate must concern the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty).'5 The New World
Information Order obviously requires the use of satellites located in outer
space.' 6 Therefore, direct broadcasting uses outer space, and as such,
remains subject to the Outer Space Treaty's provisions and regulations."
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1802 (1962) on Legal
Principles'" and Resolution 1963 (1963),'9 forerunners of the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty, clearly manifest this recognition. It is further well-settled that
the Outer Space Treaty represents the United Nations' most successful
attempt at reaching a consensus on the law of outer space.20 The treaty
establishes the following fundamental principles governing activities in outer
13. DePaul, supra note 10, at 375.
Technology has become a powerful component in contemporary life and social change.
As the pace of technology quickens, our society is overwhelmed by technology's
irresistible force. Why presume that states and sovereignty will remain unaffected?
Once direct broadcasting opens new routes for television programming, accelerating
the transfer of information and culture, international agreements or regulatory bodies
will find it difficult to stem the flow of social change.
Id.
14. See Theodore M. Hagelin, Prior Consent or the Free Flow of Information Over
International Satellite Radio and Television: A Conparison and Critique of U.S. Domestic and
International Broadcasting Policy, 8 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 265, 268 (1981).
15. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. The Outer Space Treaty is the basic treaty out
of which all other international space agreements developed. MARIETTA BENKO Er AL., SPACE
LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONS 162 (1985); see HENRI WASSENBERGH, PRINCIPLES OF OUTER
SPACE IN HINDSIGHT 16 (1991); MANFRED LACHES, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 135-47 (1972).
16. SARA FLETCHER LUTHOR, THE UNITED STATES AND THE DIRECT BROADCAST
SATELLITE: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING IN SPACE 66 (1988).
17. Erik N. Valters, Perspectives in the Emerging Law of Satellite Communication, 5 STAN.
J. INT'L STUD. 53, 64-65 (1970).
18. International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1802, U.N.
GAOR, 17th Sess., 1192d plen. mtg. (1962).
19. International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1963 (XVIII),
U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., 1280th plen. mtg. (1963).
20. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 260-64 (1979); Vladimar Kopal,
Evolution of the Main Principles of Space Law in the Institutional Framework of the United Nations,
12 J. SPACE L. 12 (1984).
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space: free use, sovereign equality of the states, prohibition of national
appropriation, states' responsibility, and common interest of all mankind. 2'
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty delineates the most important
principle that outer space is free for the use of all states . 2  Article II states
that outer space cannot be nationally appropriated.23  These articles have
been interpreted to mean that outer space can be used without seeking
permission from other states or from any international organization. The use
encompasses the right to operate communications satellites without seeking
the permission of another government?'
Yet, these rights are clearly not absolute. For example, Article IV
of the Outer Space Treaty declares that the space activities of a nation must
be conducted with due regard to the corresponding interests of all states that
are parties to the Treaty.2 5 Moreover, Article VI of the Treaty states that
"parties to the treaty shall bear an international responsibility for national
activities in outer space including the Moon and other celestial bodies."
26
Because the Outer Space Treaty fails to define or categorize what constitutes
wrongful activities under Article VI, it remains possible for a state to bear
liability for damages caused by broadcasts transmitted into another country
without that country's consent. This responsibility would also not be altered
by an unintentional crossing of an unconsenting state's boundaries by a
transmission. Accordingly, it is clear that exclusive reliance on the Outer
Space Treaty fails to resolve the debate over DBS transmissions under
international space law given the above contradictions within the Outer
Space Treaty's own articles.
In the sphere of international relations, the issue of control over
satellite programming content officially first arose in 1972, when the former
Soviet Union publicly announced various types of programming that should
be banned in the New World Information Order. 27  Not surprisingly, the
United States and its allies publicly responded by opposing all restrictions on
content, preferring a resolution of any disputes through international
21. SIGNITZER, supra note 11, at 22.
22. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, art. I.
23. Id. art. II.
24. Council of Europe, Mass Media Files No. 8, Television by Cable and Satellite 20 (1985).
25. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 15, art. IX.
26. Id. art. VI.
27. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial
Earth Satellites for Direct Television Broadcasting, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/WG.3(V)/CRP. 1, art. IV
(1974).
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cooperation. Later that same year, a compromise solution was attempted,
when the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) issued its Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of
Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Information, the Spread of
Education and Greater Cultural Exchange (1972 UNESCO Declaration).29
The 1972 UNESCO Declaration listed four types of programming that would
require varying degrees of prior consent: news, cultural broadcasts,
education, and commercial advertising. 0 However, UNESCO lacks any
legal force to alter the New World information order. ' Consequently, the
1972 UNESCO Declaration failed to resolve the DBS controversy, and
probably sharpened the rhetoric skills of both sides on the DBS debate.
The international debate on prior consent was also addressed within
the bureaucracy of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU).32
The 1971 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC)33 adopted a
resolution on the issue stating in pertinent part that "[iun devising the
characteristics of a space station in the broadcasting-satellite service, all
technical means available shall be used to reduce, to the maximum extent
practicable, the radiation over the territory of other countries unless an
agreement has been previously reached with such countries." ' Some
nations, stimulated by the prior consent school of thought, began to assert
that the 1971 WARC resolution on spillover had conclusively established
prior consent as a binding principle of international law.
However, such reliance was misplaced because as a technical
organization the ITU is notorious for remaining concerned exclusively with
28. United States of America: Draft Principles on Direct Broadcast Satellites, U.N. Doc.
AIAC.105/WG.3(V)/CRP.2, arts. IX, X (1974).
29. UNESCO Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/109 (1973).
30. Id. arts. V, VI, VII, IX.
31. KATHRYN M. QUEENEY, DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES AND THE UNITED NATIONS
120 (1978); THOMAS L. MCPHAIL, ELECTRONIC COLONIALISM: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
BROADCASTING AND COMMUNICATION 144 (1987).
32. The ITU is the main specialized agency of the United Nations for international
telecommunications. See Francis Lyall, The International Telecommunications Union and
Development, 22 J. SPACE L. 23 (1994); RITA L. WHITE & HAROLD M. WHITE, THE LAW AND
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COMMUNICATION 65-66 (1988); FRANCIS LYALL, LAW
AND SPACE COMMUNICATIONS 323 (1989).
33. ITU administrative conferences are held either at the regional or the world level. A
WARC can consider revisions in the ITU Radio Regulations. See DAVID LEIVE, INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE REGULATION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM
19 (1970).
34. PAMELA L. MEREDITH & GEORGE S. ROBINSON, SPACE LAW: A CASE STUDY FOR THE
PRACTITIONER IMPLEMENTING A TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE BUSINESS CONCEPT 176 n.86
(1979) (citing ITU Radio Regulations, art. 30, No. 2674 (WARC 79)).
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control of the transmission, not the content, of the DBS signals. 3  One
commentator has remarked that the reason for ITU's rigidly technical
orientation is that "[t]he ITU is full of engineers terrified of controversy and
terrified of the press." 36 More likely, the ITU's political powerlessness is the
result of the "black letter" regulations which govern its structure. The ITU
is organized into four permanent bodies, among them is the International
Frequency Board (IFRB)." The IFRB is the ITU organ whose primary
responsibility is to effect the orderly recording in the International Frequency
Registration of national frequency assignments to geostationary (GSO), 8 as
well as non-geostationary satellites. 9 Due to the fact that highly politicized
issues, such as the content of DBS transmissions, are not specifically
addressed within the IFRB's inflexible and voluminous registration
procedures, the IFRB (and ultimately the ITU) lacks constitutional authority
to regulate the New World Information Order.40
Given the powerlessness of both UNESCO and the ITU to directly
influence the DBS controversy, the debates surrounding the New World
Information Order finally resurfaced at the 1982 Second United Nations
Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.,' This
conference produced many recommendations which the General Assembly
35. JASENTULIYANA & LEE, supra note 12, at 195, 200. The ITU has received promptings
from many quarters to generate some structural and administrative reforms designed to furnish
mechanisms for recognizing and absorbing political input. Currently, the ITU has developed neither
the ability to deal with political or ideological concerns, nor the necessary administrative circuitry
through which such conflicts could be channeled without crippling the ITU in its technical activities.
MCPHAIL, supra note 31, at 131.
36. Will You Keep My Space?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 29, 1979, at 18.
37. GERD D. WALLENSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION AGREEMENTS 38
(1986); MEREDITH & ROBINSON, supra note 34, at 162; WHITE & WHITE, supra note 32, at 86.
38. The geostationary orbit is a ring-shaped volume of space which lies directly above the
equator at an altitude of 35,776 km. For further information see Siegfried Wiessner, The Public
Order of the Geostationary Orbit: Blueprints for the Future, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 217,
225 (1983); Martin A. Rothblatt, The Impact of International Satellite Communications Law Upon
Access to the Geostationay Orbit and the Electromagnetic Spectrum, 16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 207, 209-
10 (1981).
39. WALLENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 38.
40. The weakness of the ITU's regulatory regime was clearly exposed when the island of
Tonga, which lacked even a military aviation program, nearly seized control over a sizable portion
of the Pacific Rim Orbital Spectrum by simply following the ITU's "black letter" technical
requirements. See Albert N. Delzeit & Robert F. Beal, The Vulnerability of the Pacific Rim Orbital
Spectrum Under International Space Law, 9 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. (forthcoming Winter 1996).
41. Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International
Direct Television Broadcasting, G.A. Res. 37/92 U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., 100th plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/Res/37/92 (1982) [hereinafter Resolution 37/92].
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endorsed in December of 1982,42 most notably Resolution 37/92. 3
Resolution 37/92 was adopted by the General Assembly, rather than the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), 4 because
COPUOS was unable to fashion an agreement on this highly politicized topic
and left the task for the General Assembly to resolve.
4 5
In summary, Resolution 37/92 proclaims that states should have
equal rights to conduct direct broadcasting activities, and encourages
interstate cooperation4 Resolution 37/92 further declares that international
disputes arising from these activities should be settled through established
procedures47 and that states should bear international responsibility for their
broadcasting activities. The Resolution also proclaims that states have a duty
and right to consult and requires notification between broadcasting and
receiving states .4  This duty also includes negotiating agreements between
such states before establishing an international broadcasting service.
According to Resolution 37/29, the New World Information Order
should be compatible with the sovereign rights of states, including the
principle of non-intervention and the right to receive and impart information.
The principles also provided for cooperation to protect neighboring rights,
non-discriminatory access to technology, and the international dissemination
of information on national activities through the Secretary General. 9
Unfortunately, the nations disagreed on more issues than they agreed on.
Thus, the Resolution was not adopted unanimously. After a heated debate,
107 countries voted in favor of the Resolution, 13 voted against it, and 13
42. Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, G.A. Res. 37/90, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., 100th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
101/10 & Corr. 1, 2 (1982).
43. Resolution 37/92, supra note 41.
44. A standing member of the General Assembly since 1959, COPUOS is a main forum for
creating international space law. International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
G.A. Res. 1472, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 856th plen. mtg. (1959). Once COPUOS reaches a
consensus on a treaty, the matter is referred to the First Committee of the General Assembly, and
then to the General Assembly for a vote. Once approved by the General Assembly, the treaty is then
open for signature by the member states. See WHITE & WHITE, supra note 32, at 244; HE QIZHI,
On Strengthening the Role of COPUOS in Maintaining Outer Space for Peaceful Uses, PROC. 28TH
COLLOQUY L. OUTER SPACE 37 (1985) (proposing the enhancement of COPUOS' role in
establishing international space law).
45. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 37 U.N. GAOR, 37th




49. Resolution 37/92, supra note 41.
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states abstained °  The large opposition and abstention numbers are
significant, as well as which countries opposed the Resolution or abstained
from voting.
The United States and most Western states voted against or abstained
from voting on the Resolution.-, This abstention is relevant because these
nations possessed the capability to broadcast from the GSO, whereas most of
the nations who voted in favor of the Resolution did not.12 The lack of
unanimity among nations, and the lack of support from the space-faring
nations, causes it to remain unclear whether Resolution 37/92 evidences
customary law. This is especially so in light of the fact that it is well-settled
international law that, "[i]n considering whether the element of general and
consistent practice of States is satisfied for there to be a rule of customary
international law, the participation of the States whose interests are
specifically affect is of paramount importance rather than the mere numbers
involved."3 Thus, Resolution 37/92 cannot be cited as an authoritative
document on the DBS controversy.
Resolution 37/92 does demonstrate, however, the difficulties of
fashioning a solid international agreement on the debate between those
countries advocating prior consent, and those countries refusing to accept
restrictions on DBS communications. Although Resolution 37/92 permits
nations to utilize their right to refuse broadcasting services as a method of
censoring programs, there is no express prohibition on certain program
content. Resolution 37/92 also fails to classify broadcasts sent without prior
consultation as being illegal. Finally, Resolution 37/92 urges states to
resolve their disputes without resorting to violence, but fails to address the
recourse that states might have against unwanted transmissions5
The above background demonstrates that the controversy over the
New World Information Order is clearly not resolved. Accordingly, the
next section of this article addresses the arguments supporting the "free flow
50. CHRISTOL, supra note 4, at 154-55.
51. The following thirteen countries voted against the Resolution: Belgium, Denmark, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The following thirteen countries abstained:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Lebanon, Malawi, Morocco, New
Zealand, Portugal, and Sweden. CARL Q. CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
116 n.6 (1991).
52. Developing countries and the Socialist Bloc were the key supporters of the Resolution.
Id.
53. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 1
(Feb. 20).
54. Georgetown Space Law Group, DBS Under FCC and International Regulation, 37 VAND.
L. REV. 67, 135 (1984).
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of information" and "prior consent" schools of thought which emerged
during the above debates. The weaknesses of both philosophies will be
exposed, and an attempt will be made to resolve them by advocating
widespread adherence to regional, bilateral communication alliances.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE Two SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT CONCERNING
THE NEW WORLD INFORMATION ORDER.
The so-called "free flow of information" school of thought deems
the freedom of both information and expression as fundamental human rights
which are universal, and thus should be respected internationally." This
position claims to derive its authority from the United Nations Charter itself,
which expressly proclaims that one of the purposes of the United Nations is
to promote and encourage human rights. ' This position also claims to arise
from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is a natural
extension of the principles laid down by the United States Charter. 7 Article
19 of the Human Rights Declaration proclaims that everyone "has the right
to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, to receive, and to impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. " 8
Understanding the concept of the free flow of information requires
the understanding that the "free market of ideas" concept is based on the
basic principle of peace and has been established in international law as
"considerations of humanity." 9 Considerations of humanity are related to
human values that are already protected and established by general principles
of law.60 Every treaty, agreement, convention, or resolution begins with the
ideal of peace. Therefore, proponents argue that the free flow of
information should be readily adopted by nations striving to achieve peace.
The fantastic technical capacity of DBS has admittedly created
unprecedented opportunities to promote world peace and understanding, to
supplement the education of people located in remote areas, to disseminate
55. Wolfgang Kleinwachter, Three Waves of the Debate, in THE GLOBAL MEDIA DEBATE:
ITS RISE, FALL, AND RENEWAL 20 (George Gerbner et al. eds., 1993).
56. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 3.
57. Universal Declaration of Hwnan Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/Res/810 (1948).
58. Id. art. 19.
59. BROWNLIE, supra note 20, at 29-30.
60. Id. Under this view, it could be asserted that the ICJ has recognized faintly the free flow
of information as a basic principle of international law. In the Case Concerning the Corfu Channel,
the High Court relied on "general well-recognized principles" in deciding that Albania had a duty to
warn of the presence of mines in Albanian waters. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J.
1, 4 (Apr. 9).
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news of impending disasters, and to present cultural events." The United
Nations working group on direct broadcasting has stated that DBS holds the
"promise of unprecedented progress in communications and understanding
between peoples and cultures."62
Yet, the above view remains simplistic, given the fact that if past is
prologue, DBS technology could also be used for commercial exploitation
and cultural imperialism, if all nations followed the free flow philosophy. 3
Hence, most documents reflect that the freedom to impart information
without interference is not absolute.6 ' Most documents restrict this right to
the extent that its exercise disturbs the public order. These instruments were
never intended to vest a country with the right to disregard the fundamental
principle of state sovereignty. 6 Proponents of the free flow school thus
cannot ignore these restrictive provisions, in light of the undisputed fact that
the entire content of a treaty or document must be given effect." Giving the
entire document effect results from the presumption that the drafters
obviously intended the entire document should have meaning.6'
When they are read in their entirety, the Outer Space Treaty, United
Nations Charter, and Universal Declaration of Human Rights protect the
61. Elton R. Brown III, Direct Broadcast Satellites and Freedom of Speech, 4 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 374, 376 (1974); Mustapha Masmoundi, The New World Information Order and Direct
Broadcasting Satellites, 8 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 321, 331 (1981).
62. U.N. Doc. AIAC.105/50, para. 9 (1954).
63. Comment, Direct Satellite Broadcasting and the First Amendment, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J.
514, 515 (1974).
64. Moreover, proponents of the free flow philosophy also fail to consider a relevant question:
Has the free flow of information ever existed? As Professor McPhail notes:
Initially, custom laws, tariffs, visas, telecommunications regulations, preferential rates,
and availability of transatlantic cable had an impact on early international dispatches.
Reuters tried to block competing wire services, particularly American ones; so also
have other competitive and commercial pressures affected news flow from the
beginning. Currently, the major national supporters of the free flow philosophy are
governments responding to pressures from multinational corporate interests, ranging
from American Express to Xerox, to protect or extend their corporate, and not
necessarily national, interests. What is good for IBM World Trade, for example in
selling computer systems to the USSR, is not necessarily good for the national, or
indeed international, interests of the United States. Yet some individuals and firms are
holding tenaciously to the old information order.
MCPHAIL, supra note 31, at 33.
65. Brian Dickson, Effects of 1977 1TU World Administrative Radio Conference on the
Formulation of UN Draft Principles on Direct Broadcast Satellites (DBS), 2 ANN. AIR & SPACE L.
255, 256 (1977).
66. Interpretation of Greco-Turkish Agreement of December 1st, 1926, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B)
No. 16, at 19 (Aug. 28).
67. Advisory Opinion Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64, at 20;
Acquisition of Polish Nationality, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7, at 16-17.
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national sovereignty of the receiving state. The preamble of the Outer Space
Treaty condemns the use of any propaganda "designed or likely to provoke
or encourage any threat to the peace.", In a similar vein, Article 2 of the
United Nations Charter requires that member states should respect the
principle of sovereignty and refrain from the threat or use of force against
the "territorial integrity or political independence of any state." 9 The same
international documents thus simultaneously embody both the idea of "free
flow of information" and the principle of "sovereignty of state."10
The restrictions on freedom of speech are understandable, given that
the sovereignty of state forms an undisputed component principle of general
international law.7' It is universally recognized that a state possesses the
sovereign right to regulate all activities within its jurisdiction.7 2 The so-called
"prior consent" school of thought is therefore correct in asserting that a
nation's sovereign prerogative includes the exclusive right to regulate
sources of information that come within its domestic jurisdiction,' 3 and to
determine for itself what information may be supplied to its citizens. 74
The exercise of this right is important because DBS has generally
developed as a government, rather than a private, service.7 - The unregulated
use of DBS could pose a substantial threat to a state's ability to determine the
character of its television system.7 6  It is conceivable that the New World
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Information Order can be used to incite hatred or dissatisfaction by raising
socio-economic expectations. 7 DBS can also be used to erode the cultural
independence of a country by an uninterrupted flow of television programs
from foreign sources.78  National values and tradition could be replaced by
super-power domination.'7 A one-way flow of information could thus be
used to the destruction of a government in the absence of an international
regulatory system.
The primary objective of the prior consent philosophy is that
information and communication represent a social good, a cultural value,
and each country should have a right of self-determination in this field. The
1972 UNESCO Declaration clearly supported this position: "[I]t is
necessary that states, taking into account the principle of freedom of
information, reach or promote prior agreements concerning direct satellite
broadcasting to the population of countries other than the country of origin
of the transmission. "0 Moreover, United Nations Resolution 37/92 as
adopted, requires prior consultation in conformance with relevant ITU
instruments and DTBS principles.8'
The major problem with the prior consent view is that it greatly
overemphasizes the notion of "negative" territorial sovereignty, which is
based on the exclusion of the activities of other states.82 This negative view
of territorial sovereignty fails to recognize that self-determination of a state
entails not only a right to remain free from foreign interference, but also
certain human rights of its citizens.83 A state cannot enjoy exclusive rights
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within its own territory under international law without assuming
corresponding obligations for its own populace." Accordingly, the concept
of territorial sovereignty does not extend nearly as far as the prior consent
philosophy. The exclusive right of government censorship cannot be used to
narrow political motivations or reduce the accuracy of broadcasting.", As
Ram jakhu and Ramesh Singal note:
Satellite technology is still in its developmental stages and
the possibility of it becoming an instrument of truly
educational nature should not be allowed to pass us by
either for petty economic profits, or for foolish desire for
cloning other cultures in our own image. It should be
made an instrument for facilitating our growth as
'intelligent' beings and better contributors towards [sic] the
collective human existence. 
The strict adherence to the prior consent philosophy hinders the
collective human existence because prior consent would permit one state in a
region absolute veto power over DBS." Such unfettered veto power would
prove to be potentially disastrous in less developed nations where technical
and medical skills are often imported by the New World Information Order.
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD THE WIDESPREAD IMPLEMENTATION OF
BILATERAL COMMUNICATIONS ALLIANCES
There are differing conceptions of the function of DBS. On one
hand there is the view that DBS can serve the state through direct influence
on their audiences. 9 On the other hand is the opinion that the use of the
New World Information Order must be as separate as possible from the state
and that those using DBS must fully inform the public of their own
responsibility so that citizens might be in the best position to help direct the
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nations there must necessarily exist some rules, based on reciprocity, which restrain the power of the
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states' affairs through democratic processes.' The current tension between
the free flow of information and prior consent philosophies seems somewhat
antique, given the recent passing of the Cold War and the corresponding
shift from bipolar superpower relations to multipolar international relations.
A third, yet neglected stance, perceives the debate as more than a
question of differences between two schools of thought. Is information a
mere commercial good calling for deregulation, or is information a social
good, a cultural value, calling for a regulation framework of public services?
The bilateral agreement view calls for a middle-ground approach to the
resolution of the so-called New World information order issue. 9' This
position accepts as undisputed the prior consent belief that every state has the
right to regulate all DBS transmissions within it's borders. However, this
position also rejects a rigidly implemented content code derived from the
notion of "negative" territorial sovereignty, which overemphasizes the
exclusion of other states from a nation's borders.9
Instead, there needs to be dynamic localized content guidelines in the
form of regional arrangements between nations which share a cultural
homogeneity. The use of localized content guidelines would insure that all
recipient states participate in the production of imported programming.93
Moreover, such organizations would emphasize cooperation over dominance
and provide transnational methods to pool resources so that more countries
could become involved in the New World Information Order.9 A step in
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91. See Manfred A. Dauses, Direct Television Broadcasting By Satellites and Freedom of
Information, 3 J. SPACE L. 59 (1975). Because the Cold War's rigid framework strongly
discouraged multi-nationalism, it was previously difficult to formulate bilateral agreements for
collective action.
The Cold War was nothing but a conflict between two extreme versions of
progressivism-socialism and neoclassical capitalism .... The Cold War was nothing
but another civil war within the West or, more precisely, within the Western ideology
of progressivism. The demise of socialism and the end of the Cold War released the
world from a Western civil war over differing versions of progressivism to confront
the more fundamental issues of environmental pollution and the peaceful coexistence of
different civilizations. The 21st century will be an age in which multiple civilizations
compete, interact, coexist, and confront the need to admit the rights of nature.
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this direction has already occurred with the July 15, 1976 formation of the
Arab Satellite Communications System (ARABSAT). ARABSAT consists of
twenty Arab nations and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 9 and
was chartered to provide telecommunications services for the Arabic-
speaking countries. ARABSAT was likewise envisioned to encourage the
establishment of industries necessary for supplying telecommunications
installations to the Arab States."
Similar regional alliances in the Americas, Asia, and Africa,
encouraged on the basis of mutual respect, would not only allow significantly
cheaper access to the New World Information Order, they would also benefit
all participants with each other's individual experience.Y In a world that is
increasingly interdependent since the Cold War, the next step beyond
regional alliances could be intercontinental, multilateral alliances between the
developed and lesser developed regions. These alliances could become the
precursor of the pure educational exchange and enrichment between the
cultures, as envisioned in the United Nations Charter.
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